At its most basic, proxy war is the sponsorship of actors by an outside power to influence a violent conflict’s outcome for the sponsoring state’s strategic interests. A proxy may be a national army or militia, a nonstate group, or even a private military company. Proxies can be a useful strategy in the case of a large-scale conflict because they reduce risk and cost by avoiding direct intervention by intervening states. They also can be more accepted by local communities and provide better intelligence on the ground. In addition, proxies are often able to blend in and assimilate more easily than foreign troops, making them less likely to trigger nationalistic backlashes.
But while proxies offer advantages, they also carry risks. Sponsoring states may lose control over their proxies, or they might end up funding and training a mercenary force that ultimately does not meet their objectives. A willful or corrupt proxy can undermine the legitimacy of its sponsoring state, which can be particularly problematic if the sponsor is a gross human rights violator. In the worst-case scenario, a proxy war can widen into a global conflict between great powers.
For these reasons, a policy of proxy warfare requires considerable care and resources. Intervening states must weigh the convergence and divergence of their own objectives with those of their proxy, ensure that they have near-absolute control over their proxies, and address emerging conditions that could impact policy coherence. Consequently, a policy of proxy warfare should be considered only when it is the least bad option, and it should only be fought if there are clear and compelling strategic reasons for doing so.
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